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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRED BAUGH and GRACE H. ' 
BAUGH, Plaintiffs and Appellants,) 
vs. 
\VAYNE D. CRIDDLE, State Engi- ·. Case No. 
neer of the State of Utah, 10786 
I 
Defendant and Respondent,) 
LOGAN RIVER 'VATER USERS' 
ASSOCIATION, I t n ervenor. , 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit for a judgment declaring the validity 
of the plaintiffs' decreed water right. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The trial court determined that the water right in 
<JL1cstion was forfeited. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek an order reversing the judg-
ment of the district court, and directing the entry of a 
judgment declaring that the water right in question is 
valid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1946, the Logan Flour Mills was the owner of 
water right No. 228 with a priority of 1860 awarded 
in a decree of the District Court of Cache County in 
the case of Utah Power and Light Co. v. Richmond 
Irrigation Co. dated February 21, 1922. The right was , 
for a flow of 87 second feet of water from the Logan 
River for use for power purposes in the old Thatcher 
flour mill in Logan. The mill burned down in January, 
1946 and the use of water for power purposes ceased. 
On February 15, 1950 an application for extension of 
time within which to resume use of water was filed in 
the State Engineer's Office. See Defendants' Exhibit 3. 
This application, No. 38, was approved and the appli-
cant was given until and including January 1, 1955 
within which to resume use. 
By a deed dated May 9, 1950 the mill and the water 
right were conveyed by Logan Flour Mills, a corpora-
tion, to Crowther Bros. l\'Iilling Co., a corporation. See 
Exhibit 3. Later the property including the water right 
was conveyed to plaintiffs in this action. See Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit I. It was stipulated at the trial that the plaintiffs 
are the owners of the water right, if it is still in existence. 
(Tr. 3} 
2 
On November 19, 1954, the successor to the water 
right, Crowther Bros., wrote to the State Engineer a 
letter as follows : 
"Joseph M. Tracy 
State Engineer 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Sir: 
11-19-1954 
'Ve refer to the letter sent to Logan Flour 
Mills on 10-27 regarding the \Vater power in 
their name. 
Perhaps you have allready been informed that 
they transferred this land and 'Vater power 
rights to us some time ago, and it looks like we 
are yo be responsible for it. 
For your information we have made a contract 
for the sale of the electric power which we are 
now building to materialize. 
The new machinery has peen purchased and is 
now on its way and we are setting up the neces-
sary building for housing the machinery. 
The whole job should be ready for the first of 
the year or before. However in view of the fact 
that· we are doing this work and making steps to 
put this power into beneficial use, we are wonder;-
ing if it is sufficient proof in case we should be 
a few days late in actually gererating the power? 
\Ve have been paying our assessments with 
the Water users association and of course part 
of the stream is now running through the water 
wheel. 
You also realize that the canal supplying the 
water must be used to supply water for other 
3 
interests f~rther down stream. It is also used 
through tlus canal for irrigation. 
I.n our opinion the fact that we are actually 
takmg step~ toward. gererating this power, ft 
would constitute sufficient proof of use. 
'V: ould appreciate your suggestions, if further 
reqmrements are necessary. 
Yours very truly, 
CRO,VTHER BROS MILLING CO 
/s/ M. W. Crowther" 
(See Defendant's Exhibit 3) 
On November 30, 1954, the State Engineer replied, 
stating: 
"Crowther Brothers Milling Company 
Malad City, Idaho 
RE: Extension of Time to Resume Use #38 
ATTN: M. W. Crowther 
Dear Sir: 
In reply to your letter of November 19th in 
which you assume that your intention to resume 
use of the water shown in water right #228 of the 
Kimball Decree at an early date would be suffi-
cient evidence of resumption of use, this is to 
inform you that unless evidence is supplied this 
office on or before January 1, 1955 that this water 
has actually been put to use again or that you file 
a new request for extension of time in which to 
resume use this water right will revert to the 
public. The fact that you have purchased new 
machinery and are building new facilities is not 
sufficient evidence that the resumption of use has 
been effected. Neither is the fact that the water 
is going through your canal or through the power 
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wheel sufficient evidence for the reason that there 
are numerous rights diverted through this canal 
all of which of necessity must pass through the 
canal and through the power wheel and unless 
you are developing power as set up in the Decree 
the resumption of use has not been accomplished. 
If you can on or before January 1, 1955 fur-
nish an affidavit showing that the water involved 
in water right #228 of the Kimball Decree is 
actually in use and also show by a water measure-
ment that the water is being used for power 
purposes and being returned to Little Logan 
River at a point described in the Decree it will 
be considered that you have resumed use. How-
ever if it is impossible to get the water back into 
use again before said date it would be necessary 
for you to file another request for extension of 
time in which to resume use. Before you can file 
such a request it will be necessary for you to show 
your ownership of water right which at present 
is in the name of the Logan Flour Mills Incor-
porated. 
I am enclosing an application form on which 
you may make such filing for extension of time. 
The cost of filing this application will be $159.-00 
filing fee and an advertising fee of $20.00 makmg 
a total of $179.00. I trust this clears the matter up 
for you and you will take the necessary precau-
tions to maintain your water right. 
Very truly yours, 
Joseph M. Tracy 
STATE ENGINEER. 
Encl: Extension of Time Application. 
LCM/tic" 
(See Defendant's Exhibit 3) 
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On December 29, 1954, Crowther Bros. again wrote 
to the state engineer as follows: 
"Joseph .M. Tracy 
Office of the State Engineer 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Sir: 
We refer to our recent correspondence regard-
ing the extension of time for beneficial use of our 
water right which, as you know, is the old 
Thatcher mill property in Logan. 
For your information, we wish to advise that 
the electrical equipment has all been installed 
and will be utilizing all the available water in the 
generating of electrical power for beneficial use. 
This will be actually running on the thirtieth. 
For your information, also, we have entered 
into an Agreement to sell this electrical energy 
to Logan City so they will have the work of 
placing the water into beneficial use and this has 
actually taken place. 
This will eliminate the necessity of asking for 
an extension of time to resume the use of the 
water. 
The following is the description of the deed 
which we hold which was given to use by the 
Logan Flour Mills four years ago. 
(Land description) 
Trusting this will be sufficient evidence of 
beneficial water use, we are 





/s/ N. ,V. Crowther 
By N. \V. Crowther 
(See Defendant's Exhibit 3) 
The state engineer's file shows that on January 8, 
Hl55, an assistant attorney general wrote a letter to 
Crowther Bros. reviewing the correspondence and 
stating: 
" .. The blank form above referred to was not 
sent to you and the 'further information' men-
tioned in the statute could not be required of you; 
but the 'verified statement' and 'the date on which 
use of the water was resumed' are mandatory 
under the statute. Your letter cannot be con-
sidered a verified statement and it does not pur-
port to show that the water was used but only 
that it would be used. In addition, we must com-
ment on the fact that the applicant in this case 
was the Logan Flour Mills and no competent 
evidence of transfer of this application to your 
company has been submitted .... " 
On February 10, 1955, Crowther Bros. filed on the 
State Engineer's form a duly verified formal proof of 
resumption of use stating that .beneficial use of water 
through the restored flour mill and generator had been 
resumed within the extension period. By a letter ad-
dressed to both Logan Flour Mills and Crowther Bros. 
:\lilling Co. dated ·F'ebruary 17, 1955, the state engineer 
declared that the water right in question "has terminated 
for the reason that it has been lost by nonuse, and that 
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the water has reverted to the public." The formal proof 
of resumption of use was returned. See Defendant's 
Exhibit 3. 
Soon thereafter Crowther Bros. filed a new appli-
cation to appropriate water which was approved for 71.5 
second feet. See Exhibit 4. 
At the trial it was stipulated that the new power 
generator had been completely installed in the mill dur-
ing the month of December, 1954, and that power gen-
erated by the plant was placed in the Logan City line 
on December 30 and 31, 1954, under a contract between 
Crowther Bros. :Milling Co. and Logan City. (Tr. 3) 
Mr. Crowther testified that on the date indicated above 
sixty to sixty-five second feet of water went through 
the generator. That was all of the water of Logan River 
available for such purpose. (Tr. 6) This testimony is 
not contradicted. 
It should be noted that the only parties to the 
controversy over the alleged forfeiture of the water right 
were Crowther Bros. and the state engineer. Although 
the Logan River "\Vater Users' Association intervened 
in this case, there is no evidence that it is the owner of 
any water right on the Logan River. No water user 
appeared or introduced any evidence. There is no finding 
of fact as to any water right except the one claimed to 
have been forfeited. This is a contest only between the 
plaintiffs and the state engineer. 
The trial court made findings of fact, stating briefly. 
the substance of the state engineer's file and the corres-
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po11dence between Crowther Bros. The state engineer 
then made one conclusion of law as follows: 
"I. That since an appeal was not taken within 
the sixty days allowed by Section 73-3-H, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, the applicant and his 
successors are foreclosed from seeking a review 
of the State Engineer's decision of February 17, 
1955, rejecting proof of resumption of use for 
Award No. 228." (R. 41) 
The judgment was as follows: 
" ... NOV\T, THEREFORE, IT IS HEHE-
BY OllDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that the water right evidenced by 
A>rnrd No. 228 in the case of Utah Power & 
Light Company vs. Richmond Irrigation Com-
pany, et al, Civil No. 1772, Cache County, is 
forfeited and plaintiffs have no right to the use 
of water under said award." (R. 42) 
STATEl\IENT OF POINTS 
1. The decision of the state engineer declaring a 
forfeiture was absolutely void. 
2. Failure to file a timely action for review of the 
state engineer's decision does not prejudice the plain-
tiffs' right to relief in this case. 
3. Use of water was actually resumed within the 




1. THE DECISION OF THE STATE EN-
GINEER DECLARING A FORFEITURE 
WAS ABSOLUTELY VOID. 
Section 73-1-4, UCA, 1953, provides m part as 
follows: 
"When an appropriator or his successor in in-
terest shall abandon or cease to use water for a 
period of five years the right shall cease and 
thereupon such water shall revert to the public, 
and may be again appropriated as provided in 
this title .... " 
The section permits a water user who is not using 
the water to which he is entitled to obtain extensions 
of the five-year nonuse period by filing an application 
for extension with the state engineer and obtaining his 
approval thereof. This section requires the state engi-
neer to give sixty-days' notice of the expiration of the 
extended period and authorizes the engineer to receive 
a verified proof of resumption of use on a blank form 
to be furnished by him. 
It should be noted that the statute does not author-
ize the state engineer to fix the time when a nonuse 
period begins to run and does not authorize the engineer 
to declare a forfeiture of a vested right. The office of 
state engineer was created by statute and his powers and 
duties are administrative and extend no further than 
the statute provides. United States v. District Court, 
121 Utah l, 238 P.2d ll32; American Fork Irrigation 
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Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188. The legislature 
did not intend to vest judicial functions in the state 
engmeer. 
'¥hen the state engineer made his decision declar-
ing that the valuable decreed right with a priority of 
1860 had been forfeited by nonuse, he acted entirely 
without jurisdiction for two reasons: ( 1) he performed 
an act not authorized by Section 73-1-4, and ( 2) he per-
formed a judicial function in violation of the Constitu-
tion of Utah. These points will be di~cussed in the order 
stated. 
The last paragraph of Section 73-1-4 provides: 
" ... Sixty days before the expiration of any 
such period of extension of time, the state engi-
neer shall notify the applicant by registered mail 
of the date when such period of extension will 
expire. Before such date of expiration such appli-
cant shall file a verified statement with the state 
engineer setting forth the date on which use _of 
the water was resumed, and such further inf or-
mation as may be relevant and be required by the 
blank form which shall be furnished by the state 
engineer for said purpose, or such applicant shall 
make application for further extension of time 
in which to resume use of the water as provided 
in this section, otherwise such water right shall 
cease and thereupon the water shall revert to the 
public." 
It is clear that this paragraph contains but two 
types of provisions: ( 1) a direction to the state engineer 
to perform certain administrative acts including the 
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sending of a notice of expiration of the nonuse period, 
and ( 2) the receiving for filing of written proof of 
resumption of use and applications for further exten-
sion. There is no provision permitting the state engineer 
to declare a forfeiture of a vested property right. 
The last clause in the paragraph, 
"otherwise such water right shall cease and there-
upon the water shall revert to the public," 
is a statement of substantive law as a guide to a court, 
but does not expressly or by implication authorize the 
engineer to decide whether a water right has been for-
feited. There is no provision for the holding of a hearing 
to determine the facts from which it could be determined 
whether a water right should be declared forfeited. In-
deed, if the statute had authorized the state engineer to 
make findings of fact and draw conclusions of law, and 
to determine that a vested property right no longer 
exists, it would have been delegating to an administra-
tive officer duties, powers and jurisdiction vested in the 
court and would be unconstitutional. 
Article VIII, section I, of the Constitution of 
Utah provides: 
"The Judicial power of the State shall be 
vested in the Senate sitting as a court of impeach-
ment, in a Supreme Court, in district courts,. in 
justices of the peace, and such other court_s m-
f erior to the Supreme Court as may be established 
by law." 
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That the legislature did not intend to authorize the 
state engineer to take any action which would permit 
him to interfere with vested rights confirmed by the 
Constitution is made abundantly clear by this. Court in 
the case of Eden Irrigation Co. vs. District Court, ()1 
Utah 103, 211 P. 957. I quote: 
" ... It is, however, also contended with much 
vigor that the act permits the engineer to inter-
fere with vested rights, in that he may interfere 
with water rights that have been adjudicated and 
fixed by the court, etc. A complete answer to this 
contention is found in the act itself. The italicized 
portion of section 32 expressly provides that 
where the rights to the use of water from a stream 
or body of water have been adjudicated 'said 
water shall be distributed in accordance with such 
decree until the same be reversed, modified, 
vacated or otherwise legally set aside.' There is, 
therefore, not even a semblance of a right given 
to the engineer to interfere with adjudicated or 
so-called vested rights. . " 
The case of Fairbanks vs. Hidalgo County 
(Texas), 261 S.W. 542, is in point on the law and the 
facts. In that case an application was filed with the 
Texas Board of Water Engineers to have certain vested 
water rights cancelled of record becouse of abandonment 
and forfeiture. The Board of "\Vater Engineers denied 
the petition for the reason that it had no authority to 
perform judicial acts. The case was appealed to the court 
and affirmed. The decision was again affirmed in the 
Supreme Court which stated: 
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"It is also contended that where the facts estab-
lish an abandonment or failure to complete the 
project under the application that the board 
(Board of Water Engineers) ought to and can 
be made to cancel and annul the appropriation 
in a proper proceeding by the courts. To author-
ize such procedure on the part of the board would 
clearly authorize complaints involving these sta-
tutory matters to be loged with it ... to determine 
vested rights ... and by written decision forfeit 
and cancel the appropriation; which acts would 
involve every act of a legally constituted court in 
hearing and determining a cause before it. To 
permit this procedure and grant appellants 
prayer to compel the board to cancel and hold 
for naught the various appropriations of ap-
pellees canal company and district would in effect 
deny them their constitutional right . . . of a 
judicial determination of their vested rights as 
appropriators of water. 
* * * 
For the same reason we are of the opinion that 
the board has no authority whatever to hear arnl 
determine the question of whether or not appel-
lants' land and water rights have been condemned 
in a proceeding for that purpose as provided by 
law. This is clearly a judicial matter, and can only 
be determined by a legally constituted court." 
The question as to whether a water right is lost 
by nonuse necessarily involves matters of fact and law 
which are often complex and difficult. These include sueh 
questions as (a) the reasons for the non use of water, 
(b) whether the nonuse was voluntary or was caused by 
a flood, fire or other things beyond the control of thl' 
water user, ( c) when the nonuse period commence.~. 
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( d) whether there has been reasonable effort to resume 
use, ( 2) when actual beneficial use is resumed and ( f) 
the functions of the administrators and the courts. 
In this case the state engineer apparently assumed 
that the water right was lost by nonuse because the 
applicant for extension of time did not file a verified 
proof of resumption of use within the time given, regard-
less of the facts as to the cause of nonuse and actual 
resumption. The evidence is clear that the Logan Flour 
Mill did not voluntarily cease using the water. It was 
forced to stop using it by the fire. Did the nonuse statute 
start to run against the water right as soon as the embers 
of the fire cooled? If not, when did it start to run ( 
The cases hold that a forfeiture of a water right 
under the statute does not require "intent to abandon," 
but they all hold that the nonuse must be voluntar.IJ. 
Rocky Ford Irrigation Company v. Kents Lake Res-
cnoir Company, 104 Utah 202, 135 P.2d 108; Morris 
Y. Beau, 146 F. 423, Ramsay v. Gottsche, 51 'Vyo. 516, 
69 P .2d 535; New Mexico Products Co. \'. New Mexico 
Power Co., 42 N. _Mex. 311, 77 P.2d 634; Scherck v. 
Nichols, .55 \Vyo. 4, fl5 P.2d 74; and Horse Creek Con. 
Dist. Y. Lincoln Land Co., 54 \Vyo. 320, 92 P.2d 572. 
The cases also hold that forfeitures of water rights are 
not favored and that a statute providing for forfeitures 
must be strictly construed. 93 C.J.S. 998. 
The evidence in this case does not disclose a volun-
tary failure to use water. 
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It apparently did not occur to the state engineer 
that perhaps the application for extension of time should 
not have been filed in the first place. Because the nonuse 
was caused by a catastrophe and was not voluntary 
there may well have been no reason for filing for au 
extension. Is there anything in the statute to the effect 
that by filing for an extension the applicant waives all 
of his right to contest the forfeiture of his water right 
on equitable and legal grounds? Obviously not. Yet 
without giving proper notice, without having a hearing 
of any kind, and without affording an opportunity to 
present facts, the state engineer improperly assumed the 
power exclusively delegated to the court and declared 
that a decreed right having an 1860 priority was for-
feited. In utter disregard of due process he in effect 
amended a court decree. '¥ e challenge the respondent 
to cite any statutory or other authority for such unwar-
ranted usurpation of judicial power and authority. 
The statute, Section 73-3-1, permits the water user 
to file for an extension of time to avoid the harshness 
of its operation. Under some circumstances the period 
of five-year nonuse is exceedingly short. The statute 
does not say, expressly or by implication, that by filing 
an application for extension the applicant exposes his 
priority right to forfeiture by action of an administratiYe 
officer. As indicated above forfeiture statutes must be 
strictly construed to safeguard valuable property rights. 
The attempted declaration of forfeiture was absolutely 
void. 
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2. FAILURE TO FILE A Tll\1ELY AC-
TION TO REVIE'V THE STATE ENGI-
NEER'S DECISION DOES NOT PREJUDICE 
THE PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO RELIEF 
LN THIS CASE. 
The trial court made only one conclusion of law 
which is quoted above on page 9. That conclusion 
was that since an appeal was not taken from the state 
engineer's decision within sixty days, the applicant 
and his successors are foreclosed from now seeking a 
review of that decision. The conclusion of law completely 
misses the point. This action was filed for a judgme!1t 
declaring the validity of a decreed water right. It was 
not filed to review a decision of the state engineer. There 
is no reason for appealing from a decision which is not 
only erroneous, but which is absolutely void. 
What is the effect of the state engineer's decision 
purporting to forfeit the water right? Did he merely 
commit error which would stand unless reversed by the 
district court, or was his decision absolutely void? The 
law is that if an administrative officer or a court proceeds 
to act without jurisdiction, the act is ineffectual for all 
purposes. It is null and void from the beginning and 
no legal right can be predicated upon it. 
In 67 C.J.S., sec. 103, p. 371, the rule is stated as 
follows: 
"Powers conferred on a public officer can be 
exercised only in the manner and under the cir-
cumstances prescribed by law; and any attempted 
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exercise thereof in any other manner or under 
different circumstances is a nullity." 
See also, City of San Pedro v. City of Richmond, 
306 P.2d 949, H8 Cal. Appls. 2d 358; Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60; Bear River SanJ 
and Gravel Corp. v. Placer County, 258 P.2d 543. 
3. USE OF WATER WAS ACTUALLY 
RESUMED 'VITHIN THE EXTENSION PE-
RIOD, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IN DECLARING A FORFEITURE. 
The evidence is clear and counsel for the defendant 
and intervenor admitted that the pmver generating 
equipment was installed, the water was used, and the 
power went into the Logan City lines within the exten-
sion period. (Tr. 3) What then was the reason for tbe 
State Engineer's attempted declaration of forfeiture? 
He took the position that he should not look at the 
substance, namely, the actual beneficial use of water, but 
to the form of the document advising the state engineer 
of the resumption of use. The engineer said that because 
the letter reporting resumption of use was not on the 
state engineer's form and was not verified, the 1800 
priority water right should be declared forfeited. 
'Ve submit that the legislature did not intend any 
such result. The engineer obviously should have per· 
mitted transfer of the proof to the proper form. To 
declare a forfeiture under these facts was not oul~· 
beyond the intent of the statute, but was arbitrary and 
capricious. 'Ve submit that substance and not form 
should control. 
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Hy making these comments we, of course, do not 
concede that the engineer had power or authority to 
declare the forfeiture. If instead of the state engineer 
a court had been handling the matter it would have 
afforded to the litigants a full constitutional right to be 
heard, and to present evidence in support of their con-
tentions. Vital evidence would have included the nudter 
of actual resumption of use. The court may well haYe 
held that although through ignorance the applicant 
failed to comply strictly with the statute it should not be 
deprived of a water right where, as in this case, the water 
was actually put to use within the required time. 
There are some mitigating circumstances which a 
court may well have found excused the successor of the 
applicant from strict performance. Crowther Bros. 
probably did not know that notice of the transfer of the 
water right should have been given to the state engineer. 
(There is no express provision of the law requiring this 
notice.) 'Vhen inquiry was made of the state engineer 
by letter (see page 3 above), the state engineer did 
not send Crowther Bros. the form which provides for 
Yerification. See the letter of assistant attorney general 
dated January 8, 1955, in which it is stated: 
"The blank form above ref erred to was not sent 
to you and the 'further information' mentioned 
in the statute could not be required of you .... " 
(See page 7 of this brief.) 
The importance of furnishing an affidavit or a 
proof form is not stressed in the state engineer's letter 
quoted above on page 4 of this brief and no statute 
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is cited. The penalty for failure to comply is also 11ot 
mentioned in the letter. We believe that under the cir-
eumstances the fact of resumption of use of water withiu 
the five-year period saved the water right, and the trial 
court should have ignored the void ruling of the engineer 
and declared the validity of the water right. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the state engineer declaring a for-
feiture of the old Thatcher Mill water right was not 
only erroneous, but was absolutely void because he hail 
no authority whatever to determine the validity of a 
vested water right. This was clearly a judicial matter 
which could have been determined only by a legally 
constituted court. The statute relating to the filing of 
actions for review within 60 days has no application 
here because it provides a remedy only for erroneous 
rulings on administrative matters within the authority 
delegated to the engineer. A void decision may be at-
tacked and set aside anytime. The judgment of the 
district court resting only upon a void decision of the 
state engineer must be reversed. 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
E.J. SKEEN 
522 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellan\I 
20 
